Protect credentials from sandboxed commands¶

Any command reyn runs through the sandbox — a sandboxed_exec op, or a hook's exec / exec_capture — is still your machine's process. The sandbox bounds where a process can write and how it may reach the network (see Configure the sandbox); it does not curate what the command can see. Choose what you let a sandboxed command run with the same trust you'd give a command typed into your own shell.

This is a standing design choice, not a gap waiting to be closed: reyn's security mechanisms are opt-in, favoring predictability and a small number of knobs over a machine that silently decides what an operator did or didn't mean to expose. Protecting a credential from a sandboxed command is your responsibility, exercised at the point you write the command — not something the sandbox does for you underneath.

Network and environment variables are both open by default¶

network in sandbox.policy defaults to true (owner decision, 2026-06-05) — a sandboxed child process can reach the network the same way your own shell can, unless you set network: false for it:

sandbox:
  policy:
    network: false

A sandboxed command's environment is, by the same posture, your shell's full environment — not a curated subset by default. Every variable your shell has set is visible to the command unless you explicitly deny specific names via deny_env_names (#3901/#3823 — the whole environment passes through by default, same trust level as the launching shell):

sandbox:
  policy:
    deny_env_names:
      - OPENAI_API_KEY

If you'd rather opt IN a short list than deny individual names, set allow_env_names to a list — this switches the axis to allow-list semantics (#3823): only the names you list pass through, still intersected with deny_env_names on top:

sandbox:
  policy:
    allow_env_names:
      - PATH
      - HOME

Both defaults follow the same design choice this page opened with: reyn's sandbox re-decides nothing the launching shell could already do, unless you tell it to.

The command's stdout becomes the agent's context¶

Whatever a sandboxed_exec/exec_capture command prints to stdout is returned as the op's result and read directly by the LLM in the next turn. Don't run a command that might print a secret to stdout — an echo $API_KEY, a verbose client that logs a bearer token, a tool that dumps its own config — even if you trust where the command's output is going next, because the very next place it goes is the model's context window.

Choosing which commands to run — the method, not a list¶

There is no list of "safe" commands, because safety depends on what your own environment currently holds, which reyn cannot see from inside a command's argv. The questions that matter, before you let a sandboxed_exec/hook command run:

Would you run this exact command in your own shell, in this environment, right now? If the answer is no — because you're not sure what it reads, or you'd want to check first — that's the answer for the sandboxed version too. The sandbox does not make an otherwise-risky command safe to run unattended.
Does the command need to read the environment at all? A command that has no reason to touch env vars can't leak one it never reads. Keep the command's own scope narrow rather than relying on the sandbox to narrow it for you.
Is a secret reachable from THIS shell's environment, not just from a file on disk? A credential sitting in ~/.aws/credentials is not exposed by a command's env unless something has already loaded it into a variable. Check what your shell — and therefore reyn's — actually has set before assuming a command is safe because you don't see the credential in the config you wrote.

Credential env vars reyn's own LLM providers read¶

reyn's own LLM-provider clients read credentials from these environment variables today: OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, AZURE_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY, LITELLM_API_KEY.

This list is not the boundary of what's risky — it's an example of the shape. Every LLM provider, cloud vendor, and SaaS tool you use has its own credential env var, and reyn has no way to enumerate all of them for you. Any variable your shell has set that a command could read is worth the same scrutiny, whether or not it appears on this list.

Protect credentials from sandboxed commands¶

Network and environment variables are both open by default¶

The command's stdout becomes the agent's context¶

Choosing which commands to run — the method, not a list¶

Credential env vars reyn's own LLM providers read¶

See also¶